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Abstract: This study includes retrenchments in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits as an under-
studied mechanism to investigate possible explanations for wage inequality in the labor market. Using
longitudinal data from the Dutch Labor Supply Panel (OSA) over the period 1985–2000, and adopting a
quasi-experimental design, we not only extend current research by asking if restrictive changes in UI
benefits affect re-employment wages, but also explore variation by the level, and eligibility conditions
of UI benefits across gender and over time. Results from a series of fixed-effects models show that
lower and shorter UI benefits lead to persisting wage inequalities over time. When investigating
whether wage penalties vary across gender, we find that women experience the largest penalties.
These findings provide evidence that these particular types of restrictions in UI benefits have likely
increased rather than decreased wage inequalities between men and women.
Introduction
The impact of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
on (dis)incentives to re-enter the labour market is a
persistent and controversial issue in contemporary
research. One major question that has pre-occupied
research in this area is: how and why do generous UI
benefit systems affect workers’ unemployment durations?
Research on this topic has shown that UI benefits not
only influence workers’ job search incentives and
strategies but also their unemployment durations which
become significantly shorter when the level and duration
of the UI benefits is restricted. Yet, if cut-offs in UI
benefits stimulate workers’ return to the labour market
and improve their future employability through increas-
ing work experience, we would expect that workers’
re-employment wages over longer run should be affected
in a positive way.
Empirical evidence, however, is contentious about
the effects of UI benefit restrictions on workers’ subse-
quent wages. Some studies demonstrate that lower and
shorter UI benefits lead to lower and deteriorated
re-employment wages due to a lack of time and
economic resources (Burgess and Kingston, 1976;
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Holen, 1977; Addison
and Blackburn, 2000; Gangl, 2004, 2006; Shen, 2006;
Petrongolo, 2007). Still other studies have found no
significant results for any relationship between cut-offs
in the UI benefits and re-employment wages (Classen,
1977; Blau and Robins, 1986; Kiefer and Neumann,
1989; Meyer, 1995; van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008).
Despite the advances in existing research, two central
shortcomings remain. First, to assess the role of UI
benefits on workers’ subsequent wages more elaborate
analyses that include longer observation periods are
needed. In particular, we lack research that investigates
the effects of UI benefits that may accrue over longer
periods. As a result, the tradeoff between lower search
intensities in the short-term and positive labour market
wage outcomes in long-term has remained irreconcilable
in existing literature. This tradeoff is important because
it not only provides a more balanced view on UI benefit
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effects, but also creates a framework from which existing
theory can be advanced and developed further. Second,
the focus of previous literature on the short-term
duration outcomes has meant that more specific ques-
tions about the heterogeneity and development of wage
outcomes between men and women have been over-
looked. Most empirical analyses produce aggregated
results for men and women thereby missing any
systematic examination of gender differences.
The central aim of this study is to advance existing
research by providing new empirical evidence on the
long-term wage trajectories of workers that have been
affected by retrenchments in the level and durations of
UI benefits. We then go beyond existing research to
examine the gender-specific impact of UI retrenchments
on workers’ re-employment wages. By virtue of this, we
link the ongoing discussion of gendered labour market
outcomes to the persistent and controversial issue of the
impact of UI benefits on subsequent wages. To identify
the effect of cuts in the level and duration of UI benefits
on subsequent re-employment wages, this study follows a
twofold strategy. First, it takes advantage of two radical
reductions in the level and duration of UI benefits
enacted in the Netherlands during 1985 and 1987,
respectively. This is necessary to disentangle the effects of
UI benefits from other effects related to individuals’
previous work history and earnings. Second, it uses
longitudinal data from the Dutch labour force supply
panel (OSA) over the period 1985–2000 with wage
observations before and after the policy change to trace
the long-term wage trajectories of workers that were
affected by the policy change.
Results in this study demonstrate that men and
women affected by cuts in the level and duration of UI
benefits suffer from persisting wage penalties. During the
first retrenchments women experience larger wage
penalties compared with men affected by the same
changes. These findings provide support for theoretical
models that stress the unintended consequences of
welfare state interventions that inhibit women’s labour
force participation, occupational achievement, and earn-
ing capacities (e.g., Orloff, 1996; Misra and Akins, 1998;
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
the next section summarizes the context of the Dutch UI
benefit system and highlights the implications of each
major structural reform. Subsequently, labour market
theories will be used to predict the relationship between
UI benefits and re-employment wage developments. The
next section describes the data and discusses the
statistical methods used before presenting the empirical
results. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings
and concludes.
The Dutch UI Benefit System and
the Changes in the UI Benefits
In the Netherlands, the Unemployment Insurance Act
(Werkloosheidsverzekerings Wet) dates back to 1949.
After the Second World War, a high labour demand,
swift economic growth and low unemployment levels
characterized the Dutch labour market. It was around
the 1970s when unemployment started to become a
problem and when the UI benefit system, like in many
other Western countries, started to receive a critical
attention. The reason for this negative attention was
related to the high number of UI benefit claimants, an
increase in unemployment rates and a low economic
growth (Van Ours, 2003).
Before the 1980s, eligibility conditions were relatively
simple. To become eligible for UI benefits, bread-
male-winners should have worked for at least 13 weeks
prior to their involuntary job interruption. If this
condition was satisfied, individuals were entitled to UI
benefits that amounted to 80% of their last earned
incomes for a period of a maximum of six months
(WRR, 1985). However, as result of the oil crisis in early
1980s and the poor economic situation, the Dutch
government implemented some deep reconstructions in
the benefit system that started in the mid-1980s. The
first reconstruction was directed towards the level of the
UI benefit. As of 1 January 1985, the level of UI benefits
was brought back from 80 to 70 per cent of the last
earned income. This cutback is often referred to as the
‘price’ policy-cut because it was meant to keep the
welfare system affordable (Van Oorschot, 1998).
Two years later, in 1987, a second major change was
directed towards reductions in the numbers of the UI
benefit claimants which was referred to as the ‘volume’
policy-cut (SZW, 1998). This time the qualifying con-
ditions for UI benefits were restricted for those men and
women (as opposed to bread-male-winners) who had
worked at least 26 of the previous 52 weeks (as opposed
to 13 weeks) immediately prior to unemployment
(Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours, 2005). This
condition was referred to as the ‘week’ condition. Under
the new system, to become entitled to salary-related
benefits a ‘year’ condition was added, namely individuals
should have received incomes from employment in at
least three out of the last five employment years. If this
condition was satisfied, individuals were entitled to UI
benefits, which amounted to 70 per cent of their last
earned income which dependent on one’s employment
history lasted for a minimum of 6 months and a
maximum of 5 years. For those not satisfying this last
condition, the short-term UI benefits with a maximum
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duration of six months was introduced which amounted
to 70 per cent of the statutory minimum wage.
Unemployment Benefits and
Re-employment Wages: Some
Essential Mechanisms
Drawing upon the broader body of sociological litera-
ture, we focus on two central theories that allow us to
specify detailed mechanisms that drive wage inequalities
ranging from micro- (individual) to macro- (state) level
explanations.
Differences in Job Search and
Re-employment Wages
To uncover the mechanisms that drive men’s and
women’s job search behaviour during unemployment
we turn to classic job search theory (Lippman and
McCall, 1976; Mortensen, 1977). The standard job
search theory portrays the dynamic job search of an
unemployed worker according to a set of exogenously
determined wages (Lippman and McCall, 1976;
Mortensen, 1977), based on the assumption that all
unemployed workers receive UI benefits with an infinite
duration. In a competitive labour market, workers are
assumed to have access to imperfect information about
the job offers, which requires not only time to select but
also money to cover the search costs (Halaby, 1988;
Gangl, 2004). Search costs are not only related to the
application and screening of information (i.e. direct
search costs) but also to the foregone earnings when
rejecting a job offer or foregone benefits when accepting
a job offer (i.e. opportunity costs). An important
implication from this theory is that generous benefits
reduce the direct and opportunity costs, while at the
same time create incentives to wait and search longer.
From this point of view, longer search periods should
predict better job matches, higher productivity and
hence higher initial and subsequent wages on long term.
In a scenario when the level and duration of UI
benefits is reduced, workers will have less money to sort
out jobs. We expect that the response of the unemployed
worker to restrictive policy changes is to adjust the
reservation wage further downwards by selecting jobs
with fewer entry barriers in exchange for a ‘poorer’ job
match. In this case, adjustment of reservation wages for
those treated reflects the selection of low-quality jobs and
the poor match, whereas the reservation wages of those
otherwise similar workers not affected reflects only the
adjustment of the reservation wage due to the depreci-
ation of their human capital. Based on these arguments,
one testable prediction from the job search theory is that
those affected by a reduction in the level or duration of
the UI benefits will carry a higher penalty in their hourly
re-employment wages relative to those not affected due
to a poor job match (the poor-match hypothesis).
Previous studies that have examined effects of stricter
UI benefits on re-employment wages, find that lower
levels and durations of UI benefits lead to lower
re-employment wages due to costs that are related to
industry dislocations and labor market segmentation
(Burgess and Kingston, 1976; Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
1976; Gangl, 2006). In his studies Gangl (2006) demon-
strates that unemployment has the potential to create a
pool of previously unemployed workers concentrated in
lower paid and less favorable jobs. In this study, we
expect such effects to become magnified with the
tightening of UI benefits. We assume that—driven by
the pressure to find a job—affected workers will be
pushed to change industries or sectors more often and
willing to accept jobs with poor work conditions and
fringe benefits. This in turn may increase the risks of
dismissals and job mismatches over time. As result, those
affected are expected to suffer more often from frag-
mented careers that lower the chances of a durable
employment and may predict downward earning spirals
over time. These arguments lead to the expectation
that—on longer run—those affected workers may
become trapped in a ‘low-pay-no-pay circle’ that may
lead to persisting wage differentials over time relative to
those not affected (trap hypothesis).
Gendered Wage Outcomes and Welfare
State Interventions
An understudied mechanism to explain gender-based
inequalities in wages is the unintended role played by the
welfare state via state interventions. In the literature that
examines the issue of gender inequality in the labour
market, there is often an implicit assumption that the
welfare state enhances women’s opportunities to partici-
pate in the labour market by providing a set of services
and benefits such as childcare facilities, and/or maternity
leave benefits. As also acknowledged by Mandel and
Semyonov (2005, 2006), we argue that state interventions
can actually have negative consequences on women’s
occupational opportunities (labour market, working
times, and higher positions) and earnings. By creating
a ‘sheltered’ labour market for women, the state
produces and reinforces less favourable labour market
outcomes for women, which in turn strengthens their
power and role in the household, dependency on the
male breadwinner and the traditional sex-segregation
of market-family responsibilities (Sorensen and
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McLanahan, 1987). The support of the state to allow
women to work part-time and take extended care leaves
preserves their role as mothers bound to the household
and impedes any serious possibility for women to compete
equally with men in the labour market (Blossfeld and
Hakim, 1997; Aisenbrey et al., 2009). This mechanism
is highly salient in the Dutch context, which is often
characterized as a ‘male-breadwinner’ model (i.e. man in
full-time employment and woman in a part-time pos-
ition) (van Gils and Kraaykamp, 2008). Starting from the
1980s, women’s employment has been concentrated in
part-time jobs, interspersed with exits from the labour
market during childbearing and rearing periods (van der
Lippe and van Dijk, 2002).
An implication is that women’s patchwork employ-
ment histories make them less likely to meet the more
stringent eligibility criteria for UI benefits that are based
on past employment and wage history (Hobson, 1990;
Evertsson et al., 2009). In the current study, we extend
the literature by arguing that by introducing UI
retrenchments that do not recognize the often frag-
mented career paths of women, women are more likely
to become ineligible for UI benefits or if they are
deemed eligible, only for an inferior (short-term) benefit.
This in turn impacts women’s job search process and the
ability to remain unemployed while searching for a good
job match. This argument leads to the expectation that
women affected by stricter UI benefit will be more likely
to end up in jobs characterized by lower wages compared
to men with more extensive work experience and benefit
level and durations (gender hypothesis).
Data, Empirical Strategy and
Variables
Data Set
To test the preceding hypotheses, this study uses
longitudinal data derived from the Dutch Labor Supply
Panel (OSA) for 1985–2000. First in April 1985, and then
from September 1986 every 2 years, standard interviews
were used to collect retrospective data about labour
market dynamics of the working population. The panel
is a face-to-face biannual panel survey among a random
sample of about 2,000 households in each wave result-
ing in information of about 13,000 respondents that
participated multiple times in the panel.1 These are
sampled from the total number of households in the
Netherlands. Household members between 16 and 65
years old are asked a series of detailed demographic,
labour market, and income-related questions. Besides
information on a range of labour market issues at the
date of interview, the data set also includes retrospective
data about maximum eight labour force changes of
respondents between their last and current interview. In
addition to the labour force information, starting from
April 1985, this data set provides information on wages
of workers at the time of interview. The summary
statistics appear in Table A1 of the Appendix.
To study the effects of UI retrenchments on
re-employment wage dynamics, the analyses are limited
to persons who at the time of interview had become
employed only after a spell of unemployment. The initial
sample consisted of 3,408 person–biannual wage obser-
vations spread over 1,799 respondents who were em-
ployed at the time of interview. Due to within-group
estimations, the analyses in this study were restricted to
respondents with at least two wage observations.
Therefore, the sample size declines to 2,887 biannual
wage observations spread over 1,151 respondents, an
average of 2.5 biannual wage observations per worker in
the sample.
Empirical Strategy and Statistical Modelling
The empirical strategy for this study relies on a
‘difference-in-difference’ (DD) approach, which assumes
that selection bias across treatment groups is time
invariant and can be removed by taking differences
over time. In addition, this approach assumes that effects
of other time-varying factors are the same across groups.
Comparing the wages before and after the UI reform for
the treatment group reflects the re-employment wage
change under the influence of the exogenous shock. The
control group instead reflects the wages under the
influence of changes in the labour market conditions
only (Blundell and McCurdy, 1999).
In this study, we distinguish between the following
control and treatment groups. The first treatment group
that is affected by the policy change in 1985 comprises
those registered unemployed that had worked for at least
13 weeks prior to becoming unemployed with a max-
imum daily wage ranging between 91 and 300 Guilders.
When their wages were first observed in April 1985,
these workers were subject to the pre-policy 1985 reform
rules. But when they are next observed 6 months later
(October 1986) they will be subject to post-policy reform
rules. The control group in 1985 comprises those
unemployed who receive 91 or less guilders maximum
daily wages which lie at the bottom of the daily wage
distributions and are therefore supported by the state.
This latter group is therefore not affected by the
retrenchments and contains a natural control group in
our analyses.
The groups affected by the 1987 UI reform are distin-
guished by two central factors: (i) the week requirement,
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which is at least 26 weeks of work out of last 52 weeks;
(ii) the year requirement, which is consecutive work
experience and receipt of wages in at least 3 years out
of last 5 years. The treatment group in 1987 comprises
therefore those registered unemployed who (i) had
worked less than 26 weeks out of the 52 weeks
immediately prior to becoming unemployed, (ii) had
an interrupted work experience prior to their unemploy-
ment and (iii) received no successive wages over the last
3 years. This group qualified for the short-term UI
benefits with a replacement rate of 70 per cent of the
statutory wage up to 6 months (as opposed to 70 per
cent of last earned income with the duration of 2 years).
When first observed in April 1985 and September 1986
this group was subject to the pre-policy 1987 reform
rules. But when next observed in September 1988 this
group is subject to post-policy reform rules. The control
group in 1987 comprises those registered unemployed
who had worked at least 26 weeks out of the last 52
weeks prior to becoming unemployed with at least 5 year
work experience who did not meet the wage requirement
of receiving wages in 3 out of 6 last years but rather only
received wages in less than two of the last 6 years.
This group continued to receive 70 per cent of the last
earned incomes but because of a limited wage sequence
did not experience an extension or a cut in the UI
benefit duration. This latter group is therefore not
affected by the retrenchments and contains a natural
control group in our analyses.
Statistical Modelling and Variables
The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages
for the respondent’s current job, excluding overtime pay
and overtime hours. The dependent variable is deflated
by the ratio of mean wages earned in 1985 and only
contractual hours are used. To investigate the policy
effects using a ‘difference-in-difference’ approach, the
re-employment wage effects using ordinary least square
(OLS) can be written as follows:
lnwit ¼ 0xit þ 1ai þ 2pt þ ðapÞit þ eit ð1Þ
where ln(wit) is the natural logarithm of hourly wages of
individual i in year t deflated to the 1985 prices by the
retail prices index; xit is a vector of labour market history
and human capital controls;  refers to the vector of
coefficients related to people’s observable characteristics;
and pt indicates the period after which the policy changes
were enacted. Furthermore, the value of 1 and 2 refer
to the coefficients related to the main effects of the
treatment and period variable. The value of  equals the
estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the
treatment variable and the period variable (ap), which
captures the policy effect of UI retrenchments on those
treated. In the equation, eit refers to the equation error
term. One main problem when estimating OLS models
from a panel data is that the assumed independence of
the error and the observable characteristics is likely to be
violated and as a result incorrect standard errors are
produced (Green, 2000). To avoid the problem with
correlated errors within panels this study uses
fixed-effects models with clustered standard errors.
These models eliminate the influence of time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity and deal with the possible
correlation that occurs when individuals are in the
sample for several periods in a row. Re-employment
wage effects using fixed effects modelling can be specified
as follows:
lnwit ¼ 0xit þ 1ai þ 2pt þ ðapÞit þ i þ eit ð2Þ
where the value of ai indicates those affected by the
policy change i which is a time-invariant, individual-
specific error. To differentiate between the policy effects
for men and women separate models will be run.
In addition, to guard against selectivity problems that
arise when the wage information is not available for all
workers, this study combines Heckman’s two-step pro-
cedure (1979) with a procedure used by Vella and
Verbeek (1994) to deal with the panel character of the
data.2 Table A2 of the Appendix provides estimates of
the probability of belonging to a specific eligibility
group, with one or more wage observations conditional
on several observable characteristics.
To identify the treatment effects in this study, we
construct two time-varying period—dummy variables
where 0 refers to the period prior to the UI retrench-
ments and 1 to the period thereafter. The attained level
of education distinguishes three categories: (i) elementary
school level; (ii) lower and upper intermediate secondary
school level; and (iii) college or university degree. The
variable work experience reflects the potential years of
working experience, a proxy for knowledge acquired at
work. This variable results from the following subtrac-
tion: age—years of education—6—periods of unemploy-
ment or non-employment.
To control for re-employment wage penalties related
to previous unemployment history, several variables ap-
pear in the model, including unemployment spell, or the
most recent period of unemployment; unemployment
duration squared, which can reveal whether any negative
wage penalty related to unemployment spells diminishes or
remains persistent over time. Other control variables are
also included in the models such as, age at employment,
region of work (1¼Groningen; 2¼Drenthe; 3¼Overijssel;
4¼Gelderland; 5¼Utrecht; 6¼Noord-Holland; 7¼Zuid-
Holland; 8¼Zeeland; 9¼Noord-Brabant; 10¼ Limburg;
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11¼Amsterdam; Rotterdam; Den Haag; 12¼ Flevoland),
contractual number of working hours (12–40 h), type of
working contract at time of interview (0¼ temporary;
1¼ permanent) and whether individuals worked in a
public or private sector (1¼ public; 0¼ private). To
disentangle the reform effects from compositional effects
and changes in the socio-economic context annual
unemployment rates and the GDP per capita growth rate
are included in the models.
Empirical Results
A Descriptive Comparison between the
Treatment and the Control Group
Before starting with more elaborate analyses, it is useful
to assess the characteristics of the treatment and control
groups before both the changes in 1985 and 1987.
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that those treated
by the 1985 UI reform (which lowered the benefit level),
have slightly higher hourly wages, are more often
married men with medium and high education and
have higher cumulated work experience, compared to
those not affected (control group). Those affected by the
1987 UI reform (which restricted the qualifying condi-
tions) are more often prime-age working women with a
low and/or medium education that earn relatively lower
hourly wages compared to the control group. This group
is also characterized by longer spells of unemployment
and lower labor market experience. It is obvious that
those affected by the 1987 UI reform are more often
women with fragmented work careers that have not been
able to build up a consistent and stable work career.
Both the distribution of the observable characteristics
over the treatment and control groups as well as their
wage development before and after the changes in UI
benefits seem similar, with exception of previous spells
of unemployment, making it reasonable to suggest that
the comparison group is a credible counterfactual
estimate.
Tracing the Wage Differentials between
the Treatment and Control Groups
To understand the underlying negative relationship be-
tween cuts in the level and duration of UI benefits and
re-employment wages, we argued that job mismatches
and shifts into jobs with less favorable work conditions
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of demographic and human capital variables for the treatment and
control groups before the UI reforms, the Netherlands 1980–2000
1985 UI Reform 1987 UI Reform
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Log Hourly Wages (in Guilders) 1.48 1.53 1.52 1.49
(0.10) (0.08) (0.31) (0.45)
Female 0.66 0.34 0.39 0.57
(0.37) (0.52) (0.49) (0.50)
Age 43.52 43.31 38.18 37.25
(9.64) (11.54) (7.85) (13.34)
Marital status 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.71
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.45)
Low educated 0.54 0.44 0.42 0.45
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Medium educated 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.34
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
High educated 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.21
(0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41)
Recent months in unemployment 16.22 9.12 11.47 13.43
(7.39) (13.21) (6.25) (13.38)
Cumulated work experience (in months) 41.68 51.82 52.36 30.32
(38.32) (41.13) (38.86) (38.75)
Work Experience (in years) 21.17 21.00 24.31 20.22
(15.21) (13.15) (10.31) (9.52)
# Prior unemployment (40) 1.39 1.12 1.16 1.32
(0.36) (0.75) (0.37) (0.74)
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000.
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are two possible mechanisms through which restrictions
in the UI benefits may affect subsequent wages. That is,
those affected by the UI retrenchments will have less
time and money to sort out jobs that match with their
previous experience and will therefore be more likely to
occupy jobs with lower returns relative to those not
affected.
To assess the mid- and long-run effects of restricted
UI benefit levels, Table 2 reports OLS estimates of
equation (1) from six baseline regression models that
test for the re-employment wage effects one to five years
after the policy change. The dependent variable is the
log of hourly wages in the current job. The coefficients of
interest are a full set of post-reform period treatment
status, which indicates the policy’s effect on workers.
At this stage, OLS estimates provide evidence regarding
the one-year wage effects of the UI retrenchments,
which is not possible using a fixed-effects model. To
simplify the interpretation of the continuous treatment
variables in both 1985 and 1987, we have divided those
by 10.
The results from Models 1–3 in Table 2 reveal several
interesting implications. Consistent with the theoretical
expectations from our poor match hypothesis, we find
evidence that a decrease in the replacement ratio of UI
benefits by 10 Guilders yields a re-employment wage
penalty of about 6 percentage points one year after the
policy change. These penalties remain significant and
persistent three years (5.8 per cent) and 5 years (5.7 per
cent) after the implementation of the 1985 UI reform.
Results from Models 4–6 in Table 2 indicate that also
the 1987 UI reform has led to significant negative effects
on wages of those affected. The results imply that a
restriction by ten additional weeks for the qualifying and
base periods decreases workers’ re-employment wages
around 2 per cent several years after the policy changes.
These penalties remain constant and do not diminish in
longer run. Although, in contrast to earlier findings of
Blau and Robins (1986); Classen (1977) van Ours and
Vodopivec (2008) that find no wage effects of UI benefit
restrictions, these results suggest that restrictions in UI
benefits depress wages in a persisting rather than a
temporary way. This can be related to the fact that
affected workers experience a ‘double’ wage setback
because they not only select low-quality jobs but also
suffer from a poor match.3
But do these wage penalties persist after controlling
for heterogeneity and modeling the probability that
individuals would receive a sanction? To consider the
possibility that the preceding results are driven by
differences in the observable and unobservable charac-
teristics that might influence differently the wages
between affected and not affected groups, several
fixed-effects regression estimates from equation (2) are
conducted. The estimates limited to 5-year effects
are shown for the 1985 UI reform in Models 1A–3A in
Table 3, while the estimates for the 1987 UI reform are
shown in Models 1B–3B in Table 3. To assess potential
sample selection bias, the effects of each UI reform are
modelled separately, including a separate correction term
for each model. Robust standard errors correct for any
pattern of correlation among errors within individual
workers (Rogers, 1993). As in studies that investigate
policy effects Type II errors are likely to increase, this
Table 2 Unstandardized coefficients for the effect of UI reforms on individuals’ log hourly wage 1 until 5 years
after the UI reforms, from OLS estimates, the Netherlands 1980–2000
1985 UI reform 1987 UI reform
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years
Post-retrenchment period 0.213*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.099* 0.175*** 0.246***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.057) (0.048) (0.045)
Affected/10 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Period * Affected 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 1.257*** 1.254*** 1.258*** 1.480*** 1.482*** 1.480***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 749 947 1109 302 417 777
R2 0.683 0.489 0.442 0.024 0.039 0.053
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985-2000.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P50.001; **P50.05; *P50.1; two-tailed tests.
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study increases the power of the statistical tests to a 10
per cent level to minimize Type II errors. This implies
that results with a 10 per cent significant level will be
addressed and interpreted in this study. For substantive
reasons, I focus on the interpretation of the results in the
final model (columns 3A and 3B), which control for
labour market, job and human capital characteristics as
well as macro variables.
Results in Model 3A and 3B indicate that wage
differentials between those affected and not affected
remain present in both the retrenchments after control-
ling for observable and unobservable characteristics.
Table 3 Unstandardized coefficients for the effect of UI reforms on individuals’ log hourly wage, 5 years after
the UI reforms, from fixed-effects models, the Netherlands 1980–2000
1985 UI Reform 1987 UI Reform
Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B
Policy measures
Post-retrenchment period 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.178*** 0.006 0.007
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.031) (0.049) (0.048)
Affected/10 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Period*Affected 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.010** 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Employment and job characteristics
Recent unemployment duration 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment duration squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.009*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011)
Type of contract (¼Temporary) 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.025)
Region of work 0.002* 0.002 0.014* 0.013
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010)
Working hours 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector (¼ Public) 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.034)
Human capital characteristics
Attained level of education 0.002 0.002 0.162 0.161
(0.003) (0.003) (0.119) (0.119)
Work experience (in years) 0.003** 0.003* 0.037*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Work experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macro measures
Annual unemployment rate 0.046 0.053
(0.369) (0.168)
GDP per capita growth 0.150 0.109**
(0.104) (0.045)
Lambda () 0.011** -0.001
(0.005) (0.029)
Constant 1.429*** 1.198*** 1.187*** 1.582*** 1.822** 1.383***
(0.013) (0.082) (0.085) (0.019) (0.150) (0.154)
Observations 1109 1109 1109 777 777 777
Number of respondents 663 663 663 300 300 300
R2 0.232 0.362 0.357 0.085 0.690 0.691
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P50.001; **P50.05; *P50.1; two-tailed tests.
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More specific, results in Model 3A show that a 10
Guilders decrease in the monthly replacement rate relates
to a 1.0 per cent decrease in the subsequent hourly wages
5 years after the policy change. This means that, a
worker with an average pay of 25 Guilders4 per hour
would suffer 2 Guilders penalty per day or else 633
Guilders (¼ 288 Euros) penalty per year on the basis of
full-time work (22 days per month). Model 3B, which
estimates the policy effects of the 1987 UI reform, shows
that after controlling for differences in individual, labour
market characteristics, and socio-economic differences,
workers suffer 6 per cent in their hourly wages for each
10 additional qualifying weeks in the eligibility criteria.
This means that a worker with an average hourly wage of
25 Guilders suffers over 8 Guilders per day or else over
more than 2,100 Guilders (¼960 Euros) per year on a
full-time basis. As argued earlier in the theoretical
framework, an explanation for these large persisting
penalties may be related to the job mismatching.
Apparently choosing a job that does not fit to the
previous experience becomes a dead end for workers
affected by the UI retrenchments, leading to wage
differentials that do not disappear over time.
The correction term in Models 1A–3A is positively
significant, suggesting that those affected workers by the
1985 UI reform earn on average 1.1 per cent higher
wages per hour than those not affected. In contrast, the
lambda of the Models 1B–3B remains insignificant
suggesting that the potential selectivity in the availability
of wage information is uncorrelated with the processes
that determine wages during the 1987 UI reform.
Gendered Wage Outcomes: Do women
Incur Larger Pay Penalties?
The results presented thus far provide powerful evidence
about the average effect of lower and shorter UI benefits
on the log of hourly re-employment wages among those
affected, but at the same time raise additional questions
about the distribution of these effects among lines of
gender. Next, the study considers separate models for
men and women to investigate the distribution of wage
penalties across gender. The fixed effect Models 1 and 2
in Table 4 display the estimation results for the 1985 UI
reform, while Models 3 and 4 display the results for the
1987 UI reform. Earlier we argued that women’s
patchwork employment histories make them less likely
to meet the more stringent eligibility criteria for UI
benefits or if they are deemed eligible, they may only
take up inferior (short-term) benefits. This in turn
would impacts women’s job search process and their
opportunities to find a job with higher returns compared
to men.
Results in Model 1 and 2 in Table 4, partly support
argumentations from the gender hypothesis and offer
some striking results. First, results indicate that women
Table 4 Unstandardized coefficients for the effect of UI reforms on individuals’ log hourly wage, 5 years after
the UI reforms, from fixed-effects models, by sex, the Netherlands 1980-–2000
1985 UI Reform 1987 UI Reform
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Men Women Men Women
Post-retrenchment period 0.027* 0.074*** 0.023 0.056
(0.015) (0.018) (0.045) (0.083)
Affected/10 0.009** 0.023*** 0.004** 0.007
(0.000) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010)
Period*Affected 0.006 0.026*** 0.005** 0.006
(0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011)
Lambda () 0.002 0.020** 0.008 0.016
(0.005) (0.009) (0.034) (0.055)
Constant 1.312*** 1.003*** 1.903*** 3.927***
(0.098) (0.126) (0.366) (0.304)
Observations 659 358 413 207
Number of respondents 362 226 178 100
R2 0.414 0.413 0.637 0.678
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985-2000.
Note: Variables that control for differences in employment and job characteristics, human capital characteristics, and macro-specific changes are also included
in the analyses but not shown here.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P50.001; **P50.05; *P50.1; two-tailed tests.
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suffer by far the largest wage penalties during the
restrictions in 1985. When comparing the magnitude of
the effects between models for men and women results
indicate that negative wage effects from the 1985 UI
retrenchments disappear after 5 years for men while they
remain persistent for women. Additional results (not
shown here) suggest a significant negative gender effect
during the 1985 restrictions (¼0.029 per cent;
t-value¼ 4.86) implying a further exacerbation of wage
inequalities among men and women with an additional
2.9%. Wage effects related to the 1987 UI retrenchment
show another picture. In particular, men continue to suffer
higher wage penalties after 5 years, while for women the
negative wage effects disappear. However, a cross-equation
test of statistical significance (not presented here) shows no
significant gender effects during the 1987 retrenchment
(¼ 0.018 per cent; t-value¼ 0.83). These results, suggest
that the magnitude of wage penalties is highly dependent
on the type of the state intervention, namely for women
lower UI benefits induce higher wage penalties than shorter
durations. In contrast, for men shorter unemployment
durations generate more persisting negative effects. These
results are consistent with the theoretical expectations and
suggest that when women experience a cut in their UI
benefit entitlements, they have a higher likelihood to
accept jobs with lower prestige, rewards and wages relative
to men which become wage traps over time. These results
support earlier claims from feminist theories that argue
that state policies or changes in institutions tend to
reproduce gender inequalities by protecting and favouring
mainly men while penalizing women’s labour outcomes.
To test whether wage penalties are distributed more
equally along lines of human capital, a three-way
interaction between period, treatment group, and work
experience was added to the model. Analyses (not shown
here) demonstrate that men and women with higher
work experience suffer larger penalties relative to those
with lower work experience. Finally, to assess whether
women are penalized by the sector where they take up
jobs, a three-way interaction between period, treatment
group and sector was added to the model. Analyses (not
shown here) show that women working in the private
sector suffer much higher penalties during both the 1985
and 1987 UI reform.
Summary and Conclusion
This study examined how and under which circum-
stances retrenchments in UI benefits lead to unequal
patterns of wage developments across gender and over
time. Treating retrenchments in UI benefits as natural
experiments and using data from the Dutch Labor
Supply Panel (OSA) for the period 1985–2000, this study
developed several hypotheses about the initial and
long-term wage outcomes of those affected workers. A
central finding in this study reveals that restrictions in
the UI benefit level, duration, and eligibility criteria
affect workers’ re-employment wages negatively. That is,
a decrease in UI benefits by 10 Guilders relates to a 1.0
per cent decrease in the hourly re-employment wages or
over 633 Guilders loss of incomes per year, whereas a
restriction by 10 additional qualifying weeks relates to a
6 per cent decrease in the hourly re-employment wages
or over 2,100 Guilders loss of incomes per year. It is
striking to notice that the penalties related to the 1985
UI restrictions (that involved a cut in the UI benefit
level) do not diminish for women after five years and are
particularly significant for those women who are more
skilled employed in the private sector.
But what explains these long lasting wage penalties?
Using argumentations from job search theory and
sociological literature, an explanation for these enduring
penalties is related to the process of job mismatching.
The persisting wage penalties point out that workers
affected by UI retrenchments are more likely to accept
jobs that do not match their attained education and
work experience and fail to move into better located jobs
in the primary sector. In addition, an explanation for the
persisting gendered wage effects of UI retrenchments is
(partly) consistent with theoretical models from feminist
theories that predict larger gender pay gap inequalities
due to the nature of benefits that favour more men’s
career histories. The results of this study suggest that the
implemented UI retrenchments in the Netherlands may
have been adequate to stimulate exit rates out of
unemployment (Mooi-Reci, 2008), but they also appear
to have damaged workers’ and especially women’s
earnings prospects over time.
These findings also have implications for future
research. First, because it appears that UI retrenchments
create two-tiered systems, further research should assess
with greater rigor whether restrictions in UI benefits lead
to increased labour market segmentation by excluding
certain occupations from the reach of those groups
affected by a specific restriction. Researchers thus might
investigate the hiring decisions and behaviour of firms
during periods marked by changes in the UI benefits to
assess whether and how such restrictions contribute to
greater labour market segmentation. Second, this study
has focused only on men and women that managed to
find a job after the changes in the UI benefits, excluding
those with zero wages from the analyses. As a conse-
quence the study provides only limited view on the
effects of these changes in general. There is, however,
existing evidence in the Netherlands showing that these
particular changes in the UI benefits have led to not only
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significant shorter unemployment durations but also to
poor labor market outcomes particularly for women
(Mooi-Reci, 2008). However, the question of what is
best: a mismatched job or an unemployment spell still
remains unexplored.
Third, though it is beyond the scope of this study to
examine monitoring measures for UI benefits, additional
research should investigate and assess more broadly the
efficiency of restricting UI policies and monitoring
systems. Such an investigation might find effective
ways that, on the one hand, stimulate labour market
dynamics and, on the other hand, protect workers from
the insecurities involved with periods of unemployment.
Finally, this study assumes a proper job match is the
product of higher subsequent wages; additional research
could address the process of job matching and subse-
quent occupational mobility more carefully.
Notes
1. The OSA-panel accounts an attrition rate of around
35 per cent.
2. This combined procedure is estimated using a
random-effects panel probit model in the first
selection stage, which includes also the mean of
time-varying variables as additional regressors. In
doing so, the correlation between two successive
error terms for the same individual remains con-
stant over time.
3. To control for possible anticipation effects, inter-
action effects between the periods before the policy
changes with the treatment groups has been
introduced. When doing so, these interaction
terms remained not significant. The lack of any
decline in wages before the changes in the UI
benefits and the significant declines thereafter show
that it has not been likely that such changes have
affected men’s and women’s search behaviour before
the changes were enacted.
4. 2.20 Guilders¼ 1 Euro.
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Table A2 Random effect probit estimates for the
probability of being eligible for UI benefits and having
more than one wage observations, by separate
UI reforms, The Netherlands 1980–2000
1985 UI
Reform
1987 UI
Reform
Model 1 Model 2
Post-reform period 0.738*** 0.062
(0.195) (0.179)
Most recent unemployment
spell (in months)
0.151*** 0.002
(0.013) (0.014)
Attained years of education 0.214*** 0.076
(0.025) (0.048)
Work experience (in years) 0.128*** 0.002***
(0.018) (0.001)
Region 0.041 0.009
(0.029) (0.018)
Permanent contract 0.317** 0.245**
(0.160) (0.011)
Sector (public¼1) 0.383*** 0.100
(0.133) (0.080)
Age at employment 0.062 0.024
(0.228) (0.069)
Additional variables in the selection equation
Unemployed two waves ear-
lier (T–4)
0.050** 0.000
(0.025) (0.000)
Married 0.034 0.320
(0.157) (0.268)
Had kids 0.188* 0.381
(0.109) (0.340)
Number of kids 0.098*** 0.077*
(0.034) (0.041)
Average age throughout the
panels, by respondent
0.136*** 0.045***
(0.019) (0.017)
Average employment
duration, by respondent
0.062*** 0.038
(0.012) (0.026)
Average unemployment
duration, by respondent
0.083 0.146***
(0.086) (0.056)
Average number of
unemployment spells,
by respondent
1.353*** 0.317**
(0.475) (0.157)
Constant 3.054*** 1.441
(0.455) (0.905)
Observations 1018 1390
Respondents 585 718
Log Likelihood 436.96 194.79
Wald Chi2 153.95 117.18
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the OSA Supply Panels,
1985–2000.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P50.001; **P50.05;
*P50.1; two-tailed tests.
Appendix
Table A1 Means and standard deviations of
summary statistics
Mean (SD)
Dependent variable
Log of hourly wages in guilders 1.66 (0.61)
Treatment groups
Treatment group in 1985 (n¼ 937) 0.68 (0.33)
Control group in 1985 (n¼ 465) 0.32 (0.61)
Treatment group in 1987 (n¼ 556) 0.70 (0.23)
Control group in 1987 (n¼ 232) 0.29 (0.70)
Labour market history measures
Most recent unemployment spell
(in months)
12.80 (12.40)
Most recent unemployment spell squared 31.78 (31.21)
Region of work at time of interview 8.42 (2.06)
Type of contract at time of interview 1.37 (0.91)
Working hours 34.4 (10.3)
Sector (1¼ public) 0.34 (0.47)
Human capital measures
Attained years of education 11.72 (3.24)
Work experience (in years) 24.72 (11.61)
Demographic measures
Age (16–65 years) 41.23 (10.52)
Married/Cohabiting 0.83 (0.21)
Had kids (1¼ had kids) 1.26 (0.44)
Number of kids 1.37 (1.39)
Macro-economic measures
Annual unemployment rate 0.071 (0.01)
GDP per capita growth 0.054 (0.01)
Person biannual wage observations 2,887
Number of workers observed 1,151
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the OSA Supply Panels,
1985–2000.
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